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1 Introduction
Suppose you play a repeated symmetric game against one opponent. Suppose further
that you know that this opponent uses a very simple learning algorithm, namely the rule
imitate-if-better, the rule that simply prescribes to mimic the action of the other player
if and only if the other player received a higher payo¤ in the previous period. Since the
rule is deterministic, you therefore know exactly what your opponent will do in all future
periods and how he will react to your actions. The question we pose in this paper is
whether you can use this knowledge to exploit the imitator in the sense hat you achieve
a higher payo¤ than the imitator.
We show that surprisingly there are meaningful classes of games like all symmetric
2x2 games, Cournot duopoly, Bertrand duopoly, public goods games, common pool re-
source games, minimum e¤ort coordination games, and Diamonds search, where this is
essentially not possible. To be precise, we call imitation essentially unbeatable if in
the repeated game there exists no strategy of the opponent with which the opponent can
obtain, in total, over an innite number of periods, a payo¤ di¤erence that is more than
the maximal payo¤ di¤erence for the oneperiod game.
To gain some intuition for this, consider the game of chicken presented in the
following payo¤ matrix.
swerve straight
swerve
straight

3; 3 1; 4
4; 1 0; 0

Suppose that initially the imitator starts out with playing swerve. What should a
forward looking opponent do? If she decides to play straight, she will earn more than
the imitator today but will be copied by the imitator tomorrow. From then on, the
imitator will stay with straight forever. If she decides to play swerve today, then
she will earn the same as the imitator and the imitator will stay with swerveas long
as the opponent stays with swerve. Suppose the opponent is a dynamic relative payo¤
maximizer. In that case, the dynamic relative payo¤ maximizer can beat the imitator
at most by the maximal one-period payo¤ di¤erential of 3. Now suppose the opponent
maximizes the sum of her absolute payo¤s. The best an absolute payo¤ maximizer can
do is to play swerve forever. In this case the imitator cannot be beaten at all as he
receives the same payo¤ as his opponent. In either case, imitation comes very close
to the topperforming heuristics and there is no evolutionary pressure against such an
heuristic.
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These results extend results from our recent paper Duersch, Oechssler, and Schipper
(2011a), in which we show that imitation is subject to a money pump (i.e., can be
exploited without bounds) if and only if the relative payo¤ game is of the rock-paper-
scissors variety. The current results are stronger because they show that imitation can
only be exploited with a bound that is equal to the payo¤ di¤erence in the oneperiod
game. However, this comes at the cost of restricting ourselves to the class of symmetric
two-player exact potential games. But as mentioned above, many economically relevant
games satisfy this property. Exact potential games have been introduced by Monderer
and Shapley (1996) and are studied widely in learning in games (see Sandholm, 2010).
The behavior of learning heuristics has previously been studied mostly for the case
when all players use the same heuristic. For the case of imitate-the-best,1 Vega-Redondo
(1997) showed that in a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with imitators, the long run out-
come converges to the competitive output if small mistakes are allowed. This result has
been generalized to aggregative quasisubmodular games by Schipper (2003) and Alós-
Ferrer and Ania (2005). Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999), O¤erman, Potters, and
Sonnemans (2002), and Apesteguia et al. (2007, 2010) provide some experimental evi-
dence in favor of imitative behavior. In contrast to the above cited literature, the current
paper deals with the interaction of an imitator and a possibly forward looking, very ratio-
nal and patient player. Apart from experimental evidence in Duersch, Kolb, Oechssler,
and Schipper (2010) and our own paper Duersch at al. (2011a) we are not aware of any
work that deals with this issue. For a Cournot oligopoly with imitators and myopic best
reply players, Schipper (2009) showed that the imitators long run average payo¤s are
strictly higher than the best reply playersaverage payo¤s.2
A recent paper by Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz (2010) has a similar but comple-
mentary objective to ours. They study whether a strategy which they call copycatcan
be beaten in a symmetric two-player game by an arbitrary opponent who may have full
knowledge of the game and may play any history dependent strategy. Remarkably, the
copycat strategy can nearly match the average payo¤ of the opponent. Yet, their copy-
cat rule is far more sophisticated than our imitation rule as it entails nding a (possibly
1For the two-player case, imitate-the-best and imitate-if-better are almost equivalent, the di¤erence
being that the latter specically prescribes a tie-breaking rule (for the case of both players having equal
payo¤s in the previous round). Since we use imitate-if-better only in the two-player case, we do not need
to specify what happens if more than one other player is observed.
2In a related paper, Hehenkamp and Kaarbøe (2008) study a Cournot duopoly with one imitator and
one myopic optimizer in a rapidly changing environment with strategic substitutes. If the optimizer can
adjust decisions as fast as some parameters of the game change (like the demand), then it is possible
that the optimizer is better o¤ than the imitator if strategic substitutes are su¢ ciently weak.
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mixed) minmax strategy in the auxiliary zerosum game in each round. On the other
hand, the possible opponents are less omniscient than the opponents in our setting. In
particular, the opponents in their setting cannot perfectly predict the imitators action
in the next round.
Somewhat farther related is the literature on playing games by a population with het-
erogeneous learning rules. For instance, Droste, Hommes, and Tuinstra (2002) consider a
large population of rms matched randomly into a Cournot duopoly. A fraction of rms
play a best response to the average output in the previous period whereas others perfectly
forecast the output of either decision rule, play a best response to the forecast but bear
an extra information cost. They show that in an evolutionary dynamics with noise both
decision rules survive in the long run with uctuating fractions. Josephson (2008) intro-
duces an evolutionary stability criterion for learning rules and studies with simulations
versions of experience weighted attraction in three types of 2x2 games. Josephson (2009)
analyzes stochastic adaptation in nite games played by heterogeneous populations con-
taining best repliers, better repliers, and imitators. He provides su¢ cient conditions for
the convergence to minimal sets closed under better replies.
The article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the model and
provide a formal denition for being unbeatable. Su¢ cient conditions for imitation to
be essentially unbeatable are given in Section 3. We nish with Section 4, where we
summarize and discuss the results.
2 Model
We consider a symmetric twoplayer game (X; ), in which both players are endowed
with the same (nite or innite) set of pure actions X. For each player, the bounded
payo¤ function is denoted by  : X X  ! R, where (x; y) denotes the payo¤ to the
player choosing the rst argument when his opponent chooses the second argument. We
will frequently make use of the following denition.
Denition 1 (Relative payo¤ game) Given a symmetric two-player game (X; ), the
relative payo¤ game is (X;), where the relative payo¤ function  : X  X  ! R is
dened by
(x; y) = (x; y)  (y; x):
Note that, by construction, every relative payo¤ game is a symmetric zero-sum game
since (x; y) =  (y; x).
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The imitator follows the simple rule imitate-if-better. To be precise, the imitator
adopts the opponents action if and only if in the previous round the opponents payo¤
was strictly higher than that of the imitator. Formally, the action of the imitator yt in
period t given the action of the other player from the previous period xt 1 is
yt =

xt 1 if (xt 1; yt 1) > 0
yt 1 else
(1)
for some initial action y0 2 X.
Our aim is to determine whether there exists a strategy of the imitators opponent
that obtains substantially higher payo¤s than the imitator. We allow for any strategy
of the opponent, including very sophisticated ones. In particular, the opponent may be
innitely patient and forward looking, and may never make mistakes. More importantly,
she may know exactly what her opponent, the imitator, will do at all times, including
the imitators starting value. She may also commit to any closed loop strategy.
Consider now a situation in which an imitator starts out with a very unfavorable
initial action. A clever opponent who knows this initial action can take advantage of
it. Yet, from then on the opponent has no strategy that makes her better o¤ than the
imitator. Arguably, the disadvantage in the initial period should not play a role in the
long run. This motivates the following denition:
Denition 2 (Essentially unbeatable) We say that imitation is essentially unbeat-
able if for any initial action of the imitator and any strategy of the opponent, the imitator
can be beaten in total by at most the maximal one-period payo¤ di¤erential, i.e., if for
any y0 and any sequence fxtg,
TX
t=0
(xt; yt)  max
x;y
(x; y); for all T  0; (2)
where yt is given by equation (1).
3 Results
In this section we present two classes of games for which imitation is essentially unbeat-
able. The rst class is the class of 2x2 games. The second class is the class of games with
an exact potential.
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3.1 Symmetric 2x2 games
In the chicken game discussed in the Introduction, imitation was essentially unbeatable
since the maximal payo¤ di¤erence was 3. In this section, we extend the chicken
example of the introduction to all symmetric 2x2 games.
Proposition 1 In any symmetric 2x2 game, imitation is essentially unbeatable.
Proof. Let X = fx; x0g. Consider a period t in which the opponent achieves a strictly
positive relative payo¤, (x; x0) > 0. (If no such period t in which the opponent achieves
a strictly positive relative payo¤ exists, then trivially imitation is essentially unbeatable.)
Obviously, (x; x0)  maxx;y(x; y). Since (x; x0) > 0, the imitator imitates x in pe-
riod t + 1. For there to be another period in which the opponent achieves a strictly
positive relative payo¤, it must hold that (x0; x) > 0. This yields a contradiction since
the relative payo¤ game is symmetric zero-sum and hence (x0; x) =  (x; x0). Thus
there can be at most one period in which the opponent achieves a strictly positive relative
payo¤. 
Note that Matching penniesis not a counter-example since it is not symmetric.
3.2 Exact Potential Games
Next, we consider games that possess an exact potential function. As it turns out, a
symmetric two-player game is an exact potential game if and only if it is also an exact
potential games with respect to its relative payo¤ game. Furthermore, in our context,
exact potential games have a relative payo¤ function that is additively separable, and has
increasing and decreasing di¤erences. All these denitions may appear to be restrictive.
However, we will show below that there is a fairly large number of important examples
that fall into this class.
The following notion is due to Monderer and Shapley (1996).
Denition 3 (Exact potential games) The symmetric game (X; ) is an exact po-
tential game if there exists an exact potential function P : X X  ! R such that for all
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y 2 X and all x; x0 2 X,3
(x; y)  (x0; y) = P (x; y)  P (x0; y);
(x; y)  (x0; y) = P (y; x)  P (y; x0):
Denition 4 (Additively Separable) A relative payo¤ function  is additively sep-
arable if (x; y) = f(x) + g(y) for some functions f; g : X  ! R.
Denition 5 (Increasing/decreasing Di¤erences) Let X be a totally ordered set. A
(relative) payo¤ function  has decreasing (resp. increasing) di¤erences on XX if for
all x00; x0; y00; y0 2 X with x00 > x0 and y00 > y0,
(x00; y00) (x0; y00)  ()(x00; y0) (x0; y0): (3)
 is a valuation if it has both decreasing and increasing di¤erences.
Proposition 2 Let (X; ) be a symmetric two-player game. Suppose that X is a compact
and totally ordered set and  is continuous. Then imitation is essentially unbeatable if
any of the following conditions holds:
(i) (X; ) is an exact potential game
(ii) (X;) is an exact potential game
(iii)  has increasing di¤erences
(iv)  has decreasing di¤erences
(v)  is additively separable.
Proof. We rst note that all ve conditions are equivalent in our context. Duersch,
Oechssler, and Schipper (2011b, Theorem 20) show that (i) and (ii) are equivalent. There,
we also show that (iii) and (iv) are equivalent for all symmetric two-player zero-sum games
(Proposition 13). Hence, (iii) or (iv) imply that  is a valuation. Brânzei, Mallozzi, and
Tijs (2003, Theorem 1) show that (ii) is equivalent to  being a valuation for zero-sum
games. Finally, Topkis (1998, Theorem 2.6.4.) shows equivalence of (v) and  being a
valuation for zero-sum games. Thus, it su¢ ces to prove the claim for condition (v).
3Given the symmetry of (X;), the second equation plays the role usually played by the quantier
for all players in the denition of potential games.
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Let  be additively separable, i.e. (x; y) = f(x) + g(y) for some functions f; g :
X  ! R. Thus we have for all x00; x0; x 2 X;
(x00; x) (x0; x) = (x00; x0) (x0; x0);
which is equivalent to
(x00; x) = (x00; x0) + (x0; x) (4)
because (x0; x0) = 0 since the relative payo¤ game is a symmetric zerosum game.
Let (x0; x1; :::) be a sequence of actions generated by the opponents strategy, and let
f(xt; yt)gt=0;1;::: be her associated sequence of relative payo¤s when the imitator follows
his imitation rule in equation (1) with an initial action y0. Now consider the subsequence
of strictly positive relative payo¤s of the opponent, f(xt; yt)jt = 0; 1; :::; (xt; yt) >
0g. Assume the case that f(xt; yt)jt = 0; 1; :::; (xt; yt) > 0g is not a singleton.
(Otherwise the Proposition follows trivially.) Observe that for any adjacent elements
of the subsequence, say (xk; yk) and (xk+`; yk+`) (for some ` > 0), we must have
(xk+`; yk+`) = (xk+`; xk). This is because an imitator mimics the opponent if the
opponent obtained a strictly positive relative payo¤ and stays with his own action if the
opponents relative payo¤ was less than or equal to zero. Note that
Pk+`
t=k (xt; yt) 
(xk+`; xk) +(xk; yk) = (xk+`; yk), where the inequality follows from the fact that all
elements of the sequence strictly between k and k + ` are non-positive and the equality
follows from equation (4) above. Applying this argument inductively yields that for any
y0 and T > 0 for which (xT ; y0) > 0, we have that
TX
t=0
(xt; yt)  (xT ; y0)  max
x;y
(x; y);
where maxx;y(x; y) exists because  is continuous and X is compact. 
A su¢ cient condition for the additive separability of relative payo¤s is provided in
the next result.
Corollary 1 Consider a game (X; ) with a compact action set X and a payo¤ function
that can be written as (x; y) = f(x) + g(y) + a(x; y) for some continuous functions
f; g : X  ! R and a symmetric function a : X X  ! R (i.e., a(x; y) = a(y; x) for all
x; y 2 X). Then imitation is essentially unbeatable.
The following examples demonstrate that the assumption of additively separable rel-
ative payo¤s is not as restrictive as may be thought at rst glance. All of those games
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are also exact potential games. However, often the conditions on the relative payo¤s are
easier to verify than nding an exact potential function.
Example 1 (Cournot Duopoly with Linear Demand) Consider a (quasi) Cournot
duopoly given by the symmetric payo¤ function (x; y) = x(b x  y)  c(x) with b > 0.
Since (x; y) can be written as (x; y) = bx   x2   c(x)   xy, Corollary 1 applies, and
imitation is essentially unbeatable.
Example 2 (Bertrand Duopoly with Product Di¤erentiation) Consider a di¤er-
entiated duopoly with constant marginal costs, in which rms 1 and 2 set prices x and y,
respectively. Firm 1s prot function is given by (x; y) = (x  c)(a+ by  1
2
x), for a > 0,
b 2 [0; 1=2). Since (x; y) can be written as (x; y) = ax  ac + 1
2
cx  1
2
x2   bcy + bxy,
Corollary 1 applies, and imitation is essentially unbeatable. This example with strategic
complementarities also shows that the result is not restricted to strategic substitutes.
Example 3 (Public Goods) Consider the class of symmetric public good games de-
ned by (x; y) = g(x; y)   c(x) where g(x; y) is some symmetric monotone increasing
benet function and c(x) is an increasing cost function. Usually, it is assumed that g is an
increasing function of the sum of provisions, x+ y. Various assumptions on g have been
studied in the literature such as increasing or decreasing returns. In any case, Corollary 1
applies, and imitation is essentially unbeatable.
Example 4 (Common Pool Resources) Consider a common pool resource game
with two appropriators. Each appropriator has an endowment e > 0 that can be in-
vested in an outside activity with marginal payo¤ c > 0 or into the common pool re-
source. Let x 2 X  [0; e] denote the opponents investment into the common pool
resource (likewise y denotes the imitators investment). The return from investment into
the common pool resource is x
x+y
(a(x + y)   b(x + y)2), with a; b > 0. So the sym-
metric payo¤ function is given by (x; y) = c(e   x) + x
x+y
(a(x + y)   b(x + y)2) if
x; y > 0 and ce otherwise (see Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom, 1990). Since (x; y) =
(c(e   x) + ax   bx2)   (c(e   y) + ay   by2), Proposition 2 implies that imitation is
essentially unbeatable.
Example 5 (Minimum E¤ort Coordination) Consider the class of minimum e¤ort
games given by the symmetric payo¤ function (x; y) = minfx; yg   c(x) for some cost
function c() (see Bryant, 1983, and Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil, 1990). Corollary 1
implies that imitation is essentially unbeatable.
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Example 6 (Synergistic Relationship) Consider a synergistic relationship among two
individuals. If both devote more e¤ort to the relationship, then they are both better o¤,
but for any given e¤ort of the opponent, the return of the players e¤ort rst increases
and then decreases. The symmetric payo¤ function is given by (x; y) = x(c + y   x)
with c > 0 and x; y 2 X  R+ with X compact (see Osborne, 2004, p.39). Corollary 1
implies that imitation is essentially unbeatable.
Example 7 (Diamonds Search) Consider two players who exert e¤ort searching for
a trading partner. Any traders probability of nding another particular trader is pro-
portional to his own e¤ort and the e¤ort by the other. The payo¤ function is given
by (x; y) = xy   c(x) for  > 0 and c increasing (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990,
p. 1270). The relative payo¤ game of this two-player game is additively separable. By
Proposition 2 imitation is essentially unbeatable.
Note that any symmetric 2x2 game is also an exact potential game.
Finally, a natural question is whether additive separability of relative payo¤s (or
equivalently the existence of an exact potential function for the underlying game) are also
necessary conditions for imitation to be essentially unbeatable. The following counter-
example shows that this is not the case.
Example 8 (Coordination game with outside option) Consider the following co-
ordination game with an outside option (C) for both players of not participating (left
matrix).
 =
A B C
A
B
C
0@ 4  1 02 3 0
0 0 0
1A  =
A B C
A
B
C
0@ 0  3 03 0 0
0 0 0
1A
Note that the relative payo¤ game  (right matrix) does not have constant di¤erences.
E.g., (A;B)   (B;B) =  3 6= (A;C)   (B;C) = 0. Thus, by Topkis (1998,
Theorem 2.6.4.) it is not additively separable, and by Duersch, Oechssler, and Schipper
(2011, Theorem 3) (X; ) is not an exact potential game. Yet, imitation is essentially
unbeatable. If the imitators initial action is A, the opponent can earn at most a relative
payo¤ di¤erential of 3 after which the imitator adjusts and both earn zero from there on.
For other initial actions of the imitator, the maximal payo¤ di¤erence is at most 0.
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4 Discussion
We have shown in this paper that imitation is a behavioral rule that is surprisingly
robust to exploitation by any strategy in symmetric two-player exact potential games.
This includes strategies by truly sophisticated opponents. The property that imitate-if-
better is unbeatable in these games seems to be unique among commonly used learning
rules. We are not aware of any rule that shares this property with imitate-if-better.4
For example, there are important di¤erences between imitate-if-better and unconditional
imitation, when behavior is imitated regardless of its success. A well known example of
the latter is titfortat. To see the di¤erence, consider the following game.
 =
A B C
A
B
C
0@ 0; 0 0; 1  1; 0 1; 0 0; 0 0; 10
0; 1 10; 0 0; 0
1A  =
A B C
A
B
C
0@ 0 1  1 1 0  10
1 10 0
1A
It is easy to see that imitate-if-better is essentially unbeatable for this game. However,
titfortat could be exploited without any bound by following a cycle (A ! B ! C !
A : : : ). The reason for this di¤erence is that an imitate-if-better player would never leave
action C whereas a titfortat player can be induced to follow the opponent from C to
A.
There are other modications that may cause the imitate-if-better rule to lose the
property of being unbeatable. For instance, we assumed that an imitator sticks to his
action in case of a tie in payo¤s. To see what goes wrong with an alternative tie-braking
rule consider a homogenous Bertrand duopoly with constant marginal costs. Suppose
the imitator starts with a price equal to marginal cost. If the opponent chooses a price
strictly above marginal cost, her prot is also zero. If nevertheless, the opponent were
imitated, she could start a money pump by undercutting the imitator until they reach
again price equal to marginal cost and then start the cycle again.
Similarly, many commonly used belief learning rules, for example, best response learn-
ing or ctitious play, can easily be exploited in all games in which a Stackelberg leader
achieves a higher payo¤ than the follower (as e.g. in Cournot games). Against such
rules, the opponent can simply stubbornly choose the Stackelberg leader action know-
ing that the belief learning player will eventually converge to the Stackelberg follower
action. Thus, belief learning rules can be beaten without bounds in such games. Yet,
4Apart from close variants of imitate-if-better like rules that imitate only with a certain probability,
see e.g. Schlags (1998) proportional imitation rule.
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it remains an open question for future research whether there are other behavioral rules
that perform equally well as imitate-if-better.
Finally, in Duersch, Oechssler, and Schipper (2011a) we show some extensions to more
general classes of two-player games including relative payo¤ games with a generalized
ordinal potential that come at cost of weakening the criterion of essentially unbeatable.
Extensions to n-player games must be left for further research.
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